In the study of differential privacy, composition theorems (starting with the original paper of Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith (TCC'06)) bound the degradation of privacy when composing several differentially private algorithms. Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath (ICML'15) showed how to compute the optimal bound for composing k arbitrary ( , δ)-differentially private algorithms. We characterize the optimal composition for the more general case of k arbitrary ( 1, δ1) , . . . , ( k , δ k )-differentially private algorithms where the privacy parameters may differ for each algorithm in the composition. We show that computing the optimal composition in general is #P-complete. Since computing optimal composition exactly is infeasible (unless FP=#P), we give an approximation algorithm that computes the composition to arbitrary accuracy in polynomial time. The algorithm is a modification of Dyer's dynamic programming approach to approximately counting solutions to knapsack problems (STOC'03).
Introduction
Differential privacy is a framework that allows statistical analysis of private databases while minimizing the risks to individuals in the databases. The idea is that an individual should be relatively unaffected whether he or she decides to join or opt out of a research dataset. More specifically, the probability distribution of outputs of a statistical analysis of a database should be nearly identical to the distribution of outputs on the same database with a single person's data removed. Here the probability space is over the coin flips of the randomized differentially private algorithm that handles the queries. To formalize this, we call two databases D 0 , D 1 with n rows each neighboring if they are identical on at least n − 1 rows, and define differential privacy as follows: In the practice of differential privacy, we generally think of as a small, non-negligible, constant (e.g.
= .1). We view δ as a "security parameter" that is cryptographically small (e.g. δ = 2 −30 ). One of the important properties of differential privacy is that if we run multiple distinct differentially private algorithms on the same database, the resulting composed algorithm is also differentially private, albeit with some degradation in the privacy parameters ( , δ) . In this paper, we are interested in quantifying the degradation of privacy under composition. We will denote the composition of k differentially private algorithms This tells us that under composition, the privacy parameters of the individual algorithms "sum up," so to speak. We care about understanding composition because in practice we rarely want to release only a single statistic about a dataset. Releasing many statistics may require running multiple differentially private algorithms on the same database. Composition is also a very useful tool in algorithm design. Often, new differentially private algorithms are created by combining several simpler algorithms. Composition theorems help us analyze the privacy properties of algorithms designed in this way. Theorem 1.2 shows a linear degradation in global privacy as the number of algorithms in the composition (k) grows and it is of interest to improve on this bound. If we can prove that privacy degrades more slowly under composition, we can get more utility out of our algorithms under the same global privacy guarantees. Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan gave the following improvement on the basic summing composition above [DRV10] . . It can be shown that a degradation function of Ω( k ln(1/δ)) is necessary even for the simplest differentially private algorithms, such as randomized response [War65] .
Despite giving an asymptotically correct upper bound for the global privacy parameter, g , Theorem 1.3 is not exact. We want an exact characterization because, beyond being theoretically interesting, constant factors in composition theorems can make a substantial difference in the practice of differential privacy. Furthermore, Theorem 1.3 only applies to "homogeneous" composition where each individual algorithm has the same pair of privacy parameters, ( , δ) . In practice we often want to analyze the more general case where some individual algorithms in the composition may offer more or less privacy than others. That is, given algorithms M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M k , we want to compute the best achievable privacy parameters for (M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M k ). Formally, we want to compute the function:
It is convenient for us to view δ g as given and then compute the best g , but the dual formulation, viewing g as given, is equivalent (by binary search). Actually, we want a function that depends only on the privacy parameters of the individual algorithms:
In other words we want OptComp to give us the minimum possible g that maintains privacy for every sequence of algorithms with the given privacy parameters ( i , δ i ). A result from Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath [KOV15] characterizes OptComp for the homogeneous case.
Theorem 1.4 (Optimal Homogeneous Composition [KOV15]
1 ). For every ≥ 0 and δ
Empirically (see Appendix A), this optimal bound provides a 30-40% savings in g compared to Theorem 1.3 (and a 20% savings compared to an improved asymptotic bound from [KOV15] ). The problem remains to find the optimal composition behavior for the more general heterogeneous case. Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath also provide an upper bound for heterogeneous composition that generalizes the O( k ln(1/δ )) degradation found in Theorem 1.3 for homogeneous composition but do not comment on how close it is to optimal.
Our Results
We begin by extending the results of Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath [KOV15] to the general heterogeneous case.
Theorem 1.5 (Optimal Heterogeneous Composition
1 The phrasing of Theorem 1.4 is not exactly how it is presented in [KOV15] (which only refers to g of the form (k − 2i) for integer i), but this version can be deduced from the original. Theorem 1.5 exactly characterizes the optimal composition behavior for any arbitrary set of differentially private algorithms. It also shows that optimal composition can be computed in time exponential in k by computing the sum over S ⊆ {1, . . . , k} by brute force. Of course in practice an exponential-time algorithm is not satisfactory for large k. Our next result shows that this exponential complexity is necessary: Theorem 1.6. Computing OptComp is #P -complete, even on instances where δ 1 = δ 2 = . . . = δ k = 0 and i∈ [k] i ≤ for any desired constant > 0.
Recall that #P is the class of counting problems associated with decision problems in NP. So being #P -complete means that there is no polynomial-time algorithm for OptComp unless there is a polynomial-time algorithm for counting the number of satisfying assignments of boolean formulas (or equivalently for counting the number of solutions of all NP problems). So there is almost certainly no efficient algorithm for OptComp and therefore no analytic solution. Despite the intractability of exact computation, we show that OptComp can be approximated efficiently.
Theorem 1.7. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given rational
, and η ∈ (0, 1), outputs * satisfying
The algorithm runs in time
Note that we incur a relative error of η in approximating δ g and an additive error of η in approximating g . Since we always take g to be non-negligible or even constant, we get a very good approximation when η is polynomially small or even a constant. Thus, it is acceptable that the running time is polynomial in 1/η.
In addition to the results listed above, our proof of Theorem 1.5 also provides a somewhat simpler proof of the Kairouz-Oh-Viswanath homogeneous composition theorem (Theorem 1.4 [KOV15] ). The proof in [KOV15] introduces a view of differential privacy through the lens of hypothesis testing and uses geometric arguments. Our proof relies only on elementary techniques commonly found in the differential privacy literature.
Practical Application. The theoretical results presented here were motivated by our work on an applied project called "Privacy Tools for Sharing Research Data" 2 . We are building a system that will allow researchers with sensitive datasets to make differentially private statistics about their data available through data repositories using the Dataverse 3 platform [Cro11, Kin07] . Part of this system is a tool that helps both data depositors and data analysts distribute a global privacy budget across many statistics. Users select which statistics they would like to compute and are given estimates of how accurately each statistic can be computed. They can also redistribute their privacy budget according to which statistics they think are most valuable in their dataset. We implemented the approximation algorithm from Theorem 1.7 and integrated it with this tool to ensure that users get the most utility out of their privacy budget.
2 privacytools.seas.harvard.edu 3 dataverse.org
Technical Preliminaries
A useful notation for thinking about differential privacy is defined below. Definition 2.1. For two discrete random variables Y and Z taking values in the same output space S, the δ-approximate max-divergence of Y and Z is defined as:
Notice that an algorithm M is ( , δ) differentially private if and only if for all pairs of neighboring databases,
The standard fact that differential privacy is closed under "post processing" [DMNS06, DR13] now can be formulated as:
Adaptive Composition. The composition results in our paper actually hold for a more general model of composition than the one described in the introduction. The model is called k-fold adaptive composition and was formalized in [DRV10] . We generalize their formulation to the heterogeneous setting where privacy parameters may differ across different algorithms in the composition.
The idea is that instead of running k differentially private algorithms chosen all at once on a single database, we can imagine an adversary adaptively engaging in a "composition game." The game takes as input a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and privacy parameters ( 1 , δ 1 
Computing real-valued functions. Many of the computations we discuss involve irrational numbers and we need to be explicit about how we model such computations on finite, discrete machines. Namely when we talk about computing a function f : {0, 1}
* → R, what we really mean is computing f to any desired number q bits of precision. More precisely, given x, q, the task is to compute a number y ∈ Q such that |f (x) − y| ≤ 1 2 q . We measure the complexity of algorithms for this task as a function of |x| + q. In order to reason about the complexity of OptComp, we will also require that the inputs be rational. So when we talk about computing OptComp exactly, we actually mean given 1 , . . . , k ≥ 0, δ 1 , . . . , δ k , δ g ∈ [0, 1) all rational and an integer q, compute * such that:
| g − * | ≤ 1 2 q where g is the true optimal parameter with full precision.
Characterization of OptComp
Following [KOV15] , we show that to analyze the composition of arbitrary ( i , δ i )-DP algorithms, it suffices to analyze the composition of the following simple variant of randomized response [War65] . 
Note thatM ( ,δ) is in fact ( , δ)-DP. Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath showed thatM ( ,δ) can be used to simulate the output of every ( , δ)-DP algorithm on adjacent databases.
Lemma 3.2 ([KOV15]). For every ( , δ)-DP algorithm M and neighboring databases
For the sake of completeness, we provide a self-contained proof of this lemma, which does not use the hypothesis testing and geometric arguments in [KOV15] . Specifically, we give an explicit construction of the simulator, T in two steps. First we introduce a slight generalization ofM ( ,δ) calledM ( ,δ0,δ1) and an algorithm T that can useM ( ,δ0,δ1) to simulate every differentially private algorithm on adjacent databases for some δ 0 , δ 1 ≤ δ. Then we show how to simulateM ( ,δ0,δ1) using M ( ,δ) with an algorithm called T . The construction will look like:
Then the T needed for Lemma 3.2 will be T = T • T . Before introducingM ( ,δ0,δ1) and T we define some additional notation.
Given an ( , δ)-DP algorithm M with output space R and neighboring databases D 0 , D 1 , let P 0 , P 1 be the probability mass functions of M (D 0 ) and M (D 1 ), respectively. The definition of differential privacy tells us that for all sets S ⊆ R:
The left-hand side of the first inequality is maximized by S = S 0 for
and the left-hand side of the second inequality is maximized by
We will show how to simulate M using the following algorithm.
Definition 3.3. DefineM ( ,δ0,δ1) : {0, 1} → {0, 1, 2, 3} as follows, with δ 0 , δ 1 as defined in Equations 4 and 5 for some ( , δ)-DP algorithm and setting
. We need to show thatM ( ,δ0,δ1) is composed of a valid probability distribution. Since
To see that all of the terms are non-negative we need to show that the recurring terms e α 1 − α 0 and e α 0 − α 1 are non-negative and the rest follows by inspection. Proof.
The other inequality follows by symmetry.
Now we show how to useM ( ,δ0,δ1) to simulate any ( , δ) differentially private algorithm.
Lemma 3.5. For every ( , δ)-DP algorithm M with output space R, and every pair of neighboring databases,
Proof. Fix neighboring databases, D 0 , D 1 and let P 0 , P 1 be the probability mass functions of M on D 0 , D 1 , respectively. We will use S 0 , S 1 , δ 0 , and δ 1 as defined above in Equations 2, 3, 4, and 5. Fix r ∈ R. T : {0, 1, 2, 3} → R is defined in the table below. 
Thus:
This implies 
From here we break the calculation into the three possible cases:
We have shown how a generalization ofM ( ,δ) calledM ( ,δ0,δ1) can be used to simulate the output of every differentially private algorithm. In the next lemma we show how to simulateM ( ,δ0,δ1) using M ( ,δ) , which implies thatM ( ,δ) can be used to simulate the output of every differentially private algorithm by composing the simulator introduced in Lemma 3.5 with the one introduced below.
Lemma 3.6. For every
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that δ 0 ≥ δ 1 and set α = 1−δ, α 0 = 1−δ 0 , and α 1 = 1−δ 1 . We will represent T (M ( ,δ) (b)) as a Markov Chain below. Here, the probability of transitioning from one state to another is proportional to the weight of an edge. That is, the true probability along an edge leaving some node a is the weight divided by the sum of the weights of all of the edges leaving a (this is just to avoid cluttering the diagram with the normalizing denominators). 
All of the weights are non-negative because α 1 ≥ α 0 ≥ α, e α 1 ≥ α 0 , and p is also at most 1, which we verify now: 
Next we check the probabilities with which T outputs 1 and 2 when b = 0.
because the probabilities sum to 1. Finally we show the probabilities with which T outputs 1 and 2 when b = 1.
Again because the probabilities sum to 1, it follows that Pr[
, which completes the proof.
SoM ( ,δ) can simulate any ( , δ) differentially private algorithm. Since it is known that postprocessing preserves differential privacy (Fact 2.2), it follows that to analyze the composition of arbitrary differentially private algorithms, it suffices to analyze the composition ofM ( i,δi) 's:
For the other direction, it suffices to show that for every
)-DP. Taking the infimum over g then completes the proof.
We know from Lemma 3.2 that for every pair of neighboring databases
Thus by Fact 2.2 we have:
Now we are ready to characterize OptComp for an arbitrary set of differentially private algorithms.
Proof of Theorem 1.5. Given ( 1 , δ 1 δ 1 ) , . . . , ( k , δ k ), δ g ) is the smallest value of g such that:
SinceM is symmetric, we can instead consider the smallest value of g such that:
without loss of generality. Given g , the set S ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3} k that maximizes the right-hand side is
Now we just need to analyzeP
k because for all x ∈ S 1 ( g ), we haveP 0 (x) >P 1 (x) > 0. So we can write:
(1
Putting everything together yields:
We have characterized the optimal composition for an arbitrary set of differentially private algorithms (M 1 , . . . , M k ) under the assumption that the algorithms are chosen in advance and all run on the same database. Next we show that OptComp under this restrictive model of composition is actually equivalent under the more general k-fold adaptive composition discussed in Section 2. (( 1 , δ 1 
Proof . First suppose the privacy parameters 1 , . . . , k , δ 1 , . . . , δ k satisfy ( g , δ g )-differential privacy under adaptive composition. Then OptComp (( 1 , δ 1 ) , . . . , ( k , δ k ), δ g ) ≤ g because adaptive composition is more general than the composition defining OptComp.
Conversely, suppose OptComp( ( 1 , δ 1 
Hardness of OptComp
#P is the class of all counting problems associated with decision problems in NP. It is a set of functions that count the number of solutions to some NP problem. More formally:
Definition 4.1. A function f : {0, 1} * → N is in the class #P if there exists a polynomial p : N → N and a polynomial time algorithm M such that for every x ∈ {0, 1} * :
Definition 4.2. A function g is called #P -hard if every function f ∈ #P can be computed in polynomial time given oracle access to g. That is, evaluations of g can be done in one time step.
If a function is #P -hard, then there is no polynomial-time algorithm for computing it unless there is a polynomial-time algorithm for counting the number of solutions of all NP problems. If a function is both #P -hard and #P -easy, we say it is #P -complete. Proving that computing OptComp is #P -complete can be broken into two steps: showing that it is #P -easy and showing that it is #P -hard.
Lemma 4.4. Computing OptComp is #P -easy.
Proof. For convenience we will view rational ( 1 , δ 1 ) , . . . , ( k , δ k ) and g as given arguments to OptComp and compute δ g . Recall that the two versions of OptComp, viewing g as given and computing δ g and vice versa, are equivalent up to a polynomial factor (just run binary search over values of δ g computing polynomially many bits of precision). So the formulation we choose for the proof will not affect whether OptComp is in #P or not. Recall that in our model of computing real valued functions, we will take another input q and we will output an approximation of δ g to q bits of precision in polynomial time using a #P oracle where δ g satisfies the following:
Notice that the only part of the expression above that cannot be computed in polynomial time is the summation over subsets of {1, . . . , k}. If we knew the sum, computing δ g would be easy given our inputs. We show how to compute the sum in polynomial time using a #P oracle and it follows that computing δ g is #P-easy . 
We can now phrase a decision problem in NP: Does there exist a pair (S, n) such that g(S, n) = 1? This is in NP because given a witness (S, n), we can compute m ·f (S) and compare the output to n, thereby verifying the solution, in polynomial time. Since this is an NP problem, a #P oracle can count the number of solutions to it in one time step. Notice that for every set S, the number of solutions (pairs of the form (S, n) satisfying g(S, n) = 1) is exactly m ·f (S) because g will output 1 for g(S, 1), g(S, 2), . . . , g(S, m ·f (S)). So over all possible sets S, the number of solutions as counted by the #P oracle equals m · S⊆[k]f (S). Dividing this by m gives us the sum up to an additive error of 2 k 2 q+k = 1 2 q , which can be used to compute δ g to q bits of precision in polynomial time. This only required one call to a #P oracle. So computing OptComp is #P -easy.
Next we show that computing OptComp is also #P -hard through a series of reductions. We start with a multiplicative version of the partition problem that is known to be #P -complete by Ehrgott [Ehr00] . The problems in the chain of reductions are defined below. All of the remaining problems in our chain of reductions take inputs {w 1 , . . . , w k } where 1 ≤ w i ≤ e is the Dth root of a positive integer z i for all i ∈ [k] and some positive integer D. All of the reductions we present actually hold for every positive integer D, including D = 1 (in which case the inputs are integers). However, we will constrain D to be large enough so that our inputs are in the range [1, e] . This is because in the final reduction to OptComp, i values in the proof are set to ln(w i ). We want to show that our reductions hold for reasonable values of 's in a differential privacy setting so throughout the proofs we use w i 's ∈ [1, e] to correspond to i 's ∈ [0, 1] in the final reduction. In fact, we will later state our reductions as applying to instances where i w i ≤ e (and hence i i ≤ ) for any desired > 0. numbers w 1 , . . . , w k are specified in the input by z 1 , . . . , z k and D with the input size being the combined bit length of these integers and the numerator and denominator of r in binary).
Since the output of SUM-PARTITION is irrational, the actual computational problem is defined according to our convention in Section 2 for computing real-valued functions. That is, given an additional input q, compute a number y such that
We prove that computing OptComp is #P -hard by the following series of reductions:
Since #INT-PARTITION is known to be #P -complete [Ehr00] , the chain of reductions will prove that OptComp is #P -hard. 
There is a one-to-one correspondence between solutions to the #PARTITION problem and solutions to the given #INT-PARTITION instance. We can solve #INT-PARTITION in polynomial time with a #PARTITION oracle. Therefore #PARTITION is #P -hard.
Lemma 4.10. For every constant c > 1, #T-PARTITION is #P -hard, even on instances where
i w i ≤ c. Proof. Let c > 1 be a constant. We will reduce from #PARTITION, so consider an instance of the #PARTITION problem, W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w k } of Dth roots of integers z 1 , . . . , z k , respectively. We may assume i w i ≤ √ c since √ c is also a constant greater than 1.
which meets the input requirement for #T-PARTITION. So we can use a #T-PARTITION oracle to count the number of partitions Q ⊆ {1, . . . , k + 1} such that
. . , k}. We will argue that i∈Q w i − i ∈Q w i = T if and only if i∈P w i = i ∈P w i , which completes the proof. There are two cases to consider: w k+1 ∈ Q and w k+1 ∈ Q.
Case 1: w k+1 ∈ Q. In this case, we have:
So there is a one-to-one correspondence between solutions to the #T-PARTITION instance W where w k+1 ∈ Q and solutions to the original #PARTITION instance W .
Case 2: w k+1 ∈ Q. Solutions now look like:
One way this can be true is if w i = 1 for all i ∈ [k]. We can check ahead of time if our input set W contains all ones. If it does, then there are 2 k − 2 partitions that yield equal products (all except P = [k] and P = ∅) so we can just output 2 k − 2 as the solution and not even use our oracle. The only other way to satisfy the above expression is for i∈P w i > i∈ [k] w i which cannot happen because P ⊆ [k]. So there are no solutions in the case that w k+1 ∈ Q.
Therefore the output of the #T-PARTITION oracle on W is the solution to the #PARTITION problem. So #T-PARTITION is #P -hard.
For the next two proofs we will make use of the following fact to bound the amount of precision needed when approximating irrational numbers by rational ones in our reductions: Proof. We will use a SUM-PARTITION oracle to solve #T-PARTITION given a set W = {w 1 , . . . , w k } of Dth roots of positive integers z 1 , . . . , z k , respectively, and a positive real number
√ t for integers t, t given in the input. Notice that for every x > 0:
Above, j must be a positive integer greater than
, which tells us that the gap in products from every partition must take a particular form. This means that for a given D and W , #x-PARTITION can only be non-zero on a discrete set of possible values of x. So given our #T-PARTITION instance we can find a T > T such that the above has no solutions for x in the interval (T, T ). Specifically, solve the above quadratic for
If j is not an integer, then we know the answer to the #T-PARTITION instance is 0, so assume j is an integer and set
We can also find an interval (T , T ) just below T where no value of x in the interval can yield a solution above by setting T =
We use these discreteness properties twice in the proof. Also notice that these intervals are not too small:
where n is the input length (i.e. the bit lengths of the integers z 1 , . . . , z k , t, t ).
Proof of Claim.
where the last inequality follows from Fact 4.11. This final value is only exponentially small because j is upper bounded by k i=1 z i , which is at most exponentially large in the bit length of the z i 's. A very similar proof shows that (T , T ) is only exponentially small. This means that we can always findT ∈ (T, T ) such thatT is rational and can be fully specified with a bit length that is polynomial in the input length. Fix such a quantityT . For all y > 0, define
Then, since x-PARTITION has no solutions for x ∈ (T, T ):
So we can choose a rational r ∈ (r T , r T ) that can be specified with a number of bits that is polynomial in the input length and preserves
However the SUM-PARTITION oracle gives us
whereas we want to compute the right-hand side without the r coefficient. To get this we just pick another rational r ∈ (r T , r T ) such that r − r ≥ 2 −poly(n) . If precision were not an issue, we could run our SUM-PARTITION oracle for r and r and receive the output:
Then the following linear combination of S 1 and S 2 gives us what we want:
Claim 4.15. Computing S 1 and S 2 to within ±2 −poly(n) yields an approximation of P ∈P T i∈P w i − i ∈P w i to within ±T /4.
We just need to approximate S 1 and S 2 to within ± T 8 · r −r r −1 to get the desired precision. This additive error is only exponentially small by Claim 4.14.
Running this whole procedure again forT ∈ (T, T ), which we fixed above gives us all the information we need to count the number of solutions to the #T-PARTITION instance we were given. We can solve #T-PARTITION in polynomial time with four calls to a SUM-PARTITION oracle. Therefore SUM-PARTITION is #P -hard.
Now we prove that computing OptComp is #P -complete.
Proof of Theorem 1.6. We have already shown that computing OptComp is #P -easy. Here we prove that it is also #P -hard, thereby proving #P -completeness.
We are given an instance D, W = {w 1 , . . . , w k }, r ∈ Q, and q of SUM-PARTITION, where ∀i ∈ [k], w i is the Dth root of a corresponding integer z i , i w i ≤ c, and q specifies the desired number of bits of precision in the output. If we disregard precision, we would like to set i = ln(w i ) ∀i ∈ [k], δ 1 = δ 2 = . . . δ k = 0 and g = ln(r). Note that i i = ln ( i w i ) ≤ ln(c). Since we can take c to be an arbitrary constant greater than 1, we can ensure that i i ≤ for an arbitrary > 0.
Again we will use the version of OptComp that takes g as input and outputs δ g . After using an OptComp oracle to find δ g we know the optimal composition equation 1 from Theorem 1.5 is satisfied:
Thus we can compute:
This last expression is exactly the solution to the instance of SUM-PARTITION we were given. Taking precision into account, the input SUM-PARTITION instance has an additional input q that specifies the desired number of bits of precision in the output and we can only pass OptComp rational values so we will have to approximate i = ln(w i ) for all i and g = ln(r). Again there is a worry that when we approximate these values the set of partitions S that make i∈S w i − r · i ∈S w i > 0 might change. We want to get enough precision in our inputs so that the set of partitions over which we sum does not change and enough precision so that the output is accurate to q bits. We will calculate the approximations required for each of these two goals separately and the final precision that we use will just be the maximum of the two. We prove that we can achieve both of these goals with the next two claims. 
Proof of Claim. Recall that SUM-PARTITION is #P-hard even on instances where there are no partitions S such that i∈S w i = r · i ∈S w i so we may assume our input instance of SUM-PARTITION has no such partitions and still prove the hardness of OptComp. So to ensure that we have enough precision such that the set over which we sum does not change, we must make the error smaller than the minimum possible (in absolute value) nonzero outcome of i∈S w i − r · i ∈S w i . We now bound this quantity. Let
Since r is rational, r = a/b for two integers a and b. Let a = a D and b = b D . Then:
Where the last line follows from Fact 4.11 applied to the function f (
is only exponentially small because i∈ [k] z i is at most exponentially large in the bit length of the integers z 1 , . . . , z k . We claim that i∈S z i − a b
i ∈S z i is at least 1/b for all S ∈ S. Fix S ∈ S:
Where the last implication follows because b · i∈S z i − a · i ∈S z i is just a difference of integers so the closest nonzero value it can take on is ±1. 
Proof of Claim. We will choose p(n) = p 1 (n) + p 2 (n) where p 1 (n) is the polynomial that exists from Claim 4.16 and p 2 (n) will be determined later. Define
Claim 4.16 says that:
Bounding each term in the final expression above by 2 −(q+1) then gives us the accuracy we want. We will show directly how to bound the second term and the argument for the first term follows symmetrically. By hypothesis we have that for all S ⊆ [k]:
It follows that for all S ⊆ [k]:
Since |S + | ≤ 2 k and 1 ≤ i ∈S w i ≤ c for all S we get:
Picking p 2 (n) such that p(n) = p 1 (n) + p 2 (n) > 2k + log(rc) + q + 1 then suffices to bound the absolute value of the sum by 2 −(q+1) . Repeating the same calculation for S∈S + i∈S w i − i∈S w i will yield the same approximation except without the factor of r. So we can bound both terms by 2 −(q+1) (and therefore their sum by 2 −q ) by approximating each w i to a precision that is polynomial in n, which proves the claim.
So by the two claims above we can get an approximation of the SUM-PARTITION instance to q bits of precision in polynomial time with access to an OptComp oracle. Therefore computing OptComp is #P -hard.
Approximation of OptComp
Although we cannot hope to efficiently compute the optimal composition for a general set of differentially private algorithms (assuming P =NP or even FP = #P), we show in this section that we can approximate OptComp to arbitrary precision in polynomial time.
Theorem 1.7 (restated).
There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given rational 1 , . . . , k ≥ 0, δ 1 , . . . δ k , δ g ∈ [0, 1), and η ∈ (0, 1), outputs * satisfying
We prove Theorem 1.7 using the following three lemmas: Notice that the constraint in Lemma 5.1 is the same one that characterizes knapsack problems. Indeed, the algorithm we give for computing S⊆[k] i∈S w i is a slight modification of the known pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for counting knapsack solutions, which uses dynamic programming. Next we show that we can use this algorithm to approximate OptComp. δ 1 
In other words, if the values we are given are all integer multiples of some 0 where e 0 is rational, we can determine whether or not the composition of those privacy parameters is (a * · 0 , δ g )-DP in pseudo-polynomial time, for every positive integer a * . Running binary search over integers a * , we can find the minimum such integer. When 0 is small, this gives us a good overestimate of the optimal composition of the discrete input privacy parameters. This means that given any inputs ( 1 , δ 1 ) 1 , δ 1 ) , . . . , ( k , δ k ), δ g ). The next lemma tells us that this is also a good approximation of OptComp (( 1 , δ 1 For all 1 , . . . , k , c 1 , . . . , c k ≥ 0 and δ 1 , . . . , δ k , δ g ∈ [0, 1):
where c = k i=1 c i Next we prove the three lemmas and then show that Theorem 1.7 follows.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. We modify Dyer's algorithm for approximately counting solutions to knapsack problems [Dye03] . The algorithm uses dynamic programming. Given non-negative integers  a 1 , . . . , a k , B, and weights w 1 , . . . , w k ∈ Q, define
We want to compute F (k, B). We can find this by tabulating F (r, s) for (0 ≤ r ≤ k, 0 ≤ s ≤ B) using the recursion: 
The right-hand side and
(1 + e i ) are easy to compute given the inputs (note that e i is rational for all i ∈ [k] because each is an integer power of e 0 ). So in order to check the inequality, we will show how to compute the sum. Define
multiples of some 0 where e 0 is rational. We are given rational 1 , . . . , k ≥ 0, δ 1 , . . . δ k , δ g ∈ [0, 1), and η ∈ (0, 1). Let = i∈ [k] i /k be the arithmetic mean of the i values. Let β = η/(k·(1+ )+1), set 0 = ln(1 + β), and for all i ∈ [k] set a i = i · (1/β + 1) and i = 0 · a i . We will use the following bounds on 0 in the proof:
With these settings, the a i 's are non-negative integers, the i values are all integer multiples of 0 and e 0 is rational. So for every positive integer a we can apply Lemma 5.2 to determine whether or not OptComp (( 1 , δ 1 ) , . . . , ( k , δ k ), δ g ) ≤ a· 0 in time O k · i∈ [k] a i . Running binary search over integers a, we can find the minimum such integer, which we will call a * . The algorithm's estimate of OptComp( ( 1 , δ 1 ) , . . . , ( k , δ k ), δ g ) will be a * · 0 . However since this number is irrational, we will use the Taylor approximation of the natural logarithm to output * satisfying a * · 0 ≤ * ≤ a * · 0 +β− 0 . Since we only need to calculate a few terms of the Taylor expansion of ln(1 + β) to achieve this approximation, this step will not affect our running time.
Since we choose a * to be the minimum integer satisfying composition we have: * − β ≤ (a * − 1) · 0 ≤ OptComp( ( 1 , δ 1 ) satisfying one of the inequalities in the theorem. We also have for all i ∈ [k]:
A Comparison of Composition Theorems
The figures below compare the performances of four homogeneous composition theorems. In all figures, "Summing" refers to basic composition -Theorem 1.2 [DKMMN06] , "DRV" refers to advanced composition -Theorem 1.3 [DRV10] , "KOV Bound" refers to a bound in [KOV15] that is a closed form approximation of the optimal composition theorem, and "Optimal" refers to the optimal composition theorem -Theorem 1.4 [KOV15] . Here we are composing k mechanisms that are ( , δ) differentially private to obtain an ( g , δ g ) differentially private mechanism as guaranteed by one of the composition theorems. Figure 1 divided by the optimal composition curve. We see that relative performances of the KOV bound and DRV seem to converge to a constant. The g values given by the KOV bound are about 20% larger than optimal and the values given by advanced composition are about 30-40% larger than optimal.
